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of the latter becomes burdensome on the former.1 3 It accordingly
behooves each state to set its own house in order in this field.
The inherent problem raised on appeal, namely, whether practical
administration, convenience and saving of expense to the city justify
such an exercise of police power, was not fully exploited in the instant
opinion, probably because complainant expressed its willingness to
pay reasonable inspection expenses. If, however, the expense of 67
separate county inspectors, or an even greater number of municipal
inspectors, were forced upon a milk producer -and passed along to
the consumer - state action to achieve a standard inspection would
become advisable if not inevitable. State ex rel. Larson v. Minneapolis14 outlines the weight of authority on this matter, but the Minnesota court carried the discussion of the federal question little further
than did the Florida Court. In view of the fact that the Ocala ordinance was held in contravention of the Florida Constitution, a detailed
analysis of the federal issue could not, of course, be expected. The
tenor of Miller v. Williams and of the Dean case, however, indicates
that the Florida Court has arrived at the probable conclusion of this
issue.

L. C.

NANcE

HOMESTEAD: ABANDONMENT
McCullough v. Forbes, 47 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1950)
Defendant tax assessor denied plaintiff a tax exemption on her
alleged homestead for the stated reason, quoted in the record on
appeal, "Occupancy not established by owner as of January 1, 1949."
The board of equalization affirmed the ruling, and plaintiff filed proceedings in the circuit court. The special master found that she intended to resume occupancy and had received this tax exemption for
several prior years under similar conditions; accordingly he recom13Cf., e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 83 (1951); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
'4190 Minn. 138, 251 N.W. 121 (1933).
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mended allowance for 1949. The chancellor sustained defendant's
exceptions and denied the exemption. On appeal, HELD, a property
owner who rents her home on a month-to-month basis while living
elsewhere to obtain necessary medical care, and who intends to resume occupancy when her health permits, is not entitled to the exemption for the year stated. Judgment affirmed without majority opinion, Justices Chapman, Terrell and Roberts dissenting with opinion.
The annual exemption from taxation of $5,000 of the assessed
valuation of one's permanent residence 1 and the permanent exemption
of homestead realty from forced sale2 are largely different concepts, 3
but abandonment for tax-exemption purposes and abandonment foi
forced-sale purposes have heretofore been placed by the Supreme
Court on the same basis.4 The Attorney General, following the decisions, has summarized the law as follows: 5
"... . the requirement for homestead exemption from taxation
being essentially the same, . . . decisions relating to homestead

exemptions from forced sale will be persuasive in determining
similar questions relating to homestead tax exemptions."
The instant case turns on what constitutes physical abandonment; but, inasmuch as this phase of the law is necessarily based
on domicil, the latter is analyzed first. "Residence" and "domicil" are
not synonymous; the former signifies mere temporary physical location, while the latter denotes one's permanent home, 6 the center of
his legal relationships.7 An individual may have several residences,
but under the law of any single jurisdiction he can have only one
IFLA.
2

CONST. Art. X, §7; family headship is not required.

FLA. CONST. Art. X, §1.

3

For an extensive analysis of these distinctions see Crosby and Miller, Our
Legal Chameleon, The FloridaHomestead Exemption, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 346
(1949).
4
See, e.g., Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947); Crosby
and Miller, supra note 3,at 37-40, 369-870.
5
0P. AT'ry GEN.FLA. 050-214 (Apr. 25, 1950).
GSee, e.g., Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 477-480, 149 So. 483, 487-488
(1933).
7
As Holmes, J., so aptly defined the term in Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S.
619, 625 (1914), "The very meaning of domicil is the technically pregminent
headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights
and duties that have been attached to it by the law may be determined."
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domicil. 8 He must have that one, however; ' and once established
it remains his domicil until he abandons it for another. The mere
intent to acquire a new domicil avails nothing unless accompanied
by actual removal from the old one; neither does the fact of removal
without the intent avail. 10 Both must exist."
Since one domicil is essential in the law, 12 it follows that the

domicil cannot possibly be abandoned without a new one being acquired. The claimant of an established domicil, including a claimant of the homestead-realty tax exemption, is not compelled to reside
at all times on the property. His temporary absence for reasons of
business," health, 14 pleasure, or education 15 does not constitute abandonment, even though he rents the homestead and is not occupying it
on January 1, the crucial date in each year. 16 The determination is
one of fact, and can be reviewed in turn by the county commissioners
sitting as a board of equalization, the circuit court, and the Supreme
Court.' 7

In the light of the foregoing principles the facts in the record on
appeal in the instant case are of especial importance. During the
gasoline rationing of World War 11, plaintiff, a widow then approxi8
1t is recognized that the same jurisdiction may, by varying the factors evidencing domicil among different fields of law, find itself in the predicament of
having fixed one domicil for one field and another for a different field; but the

fact remains that as regards any single field the invariable rule is one domicil per
person; cf. Holmes, J., supra note 7, at 625.
9
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va.
790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
'OFor the various factors evidencing domicil at any given time see, e.g., Croker
v. Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1931); Crosby and Miller, supra note 3, at 30,
369-370.
"'See, e.g., Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 862, 43 So. 923, 924 (1907).
Both factors were established in, e.g., Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d

723 (1945).

' 2 See notes 7, 9 supra.
laE.g., Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Marshall, 148 Fla. 286, 4 So.2d 337
(1941).
' 4 E.g., Nelson v. Hainlin, 89 Fla. 356, 104 So. 589 (1925).
'5 Reid v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920).
16Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So.2d 529 (1947); see Crosby and
Miller, supra note 3, at 869-370.
17
FLA. STAT. §192.12 (1949); for a detailed explanation see Crosby and
Miller, supra note 3, at 379-384.
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mately 80, took a hotel room in the city because she could not get
gasoline for necessary journeys into Jacksonville from her Atlantic
Beach home, built by her husband and herself in 1928, and was unsuccessful in obtaining a female companion to live with her there.
Later she moved back. She was allowed the homestead-realty tax
-exemption each year during the entire period. In 1948 she fell in
a hotel room that she kept in the city, broke her wrist, and dislocated
her collar bone. Nursing care was essential, and she was unable to
obtain it in her home. She remained first in a hospital and then in
a convalescent home; then for a short time she secured 24-hour nursing
care in her own home, but found this impracticable; and then she
took a room in a private home while convalescing, where the lady of
the house looked after her. To help defray expenses, she stored her
furniture and clothing, as well as other possessions not currently required, in the attic of her home and rented the house to tenants on a
monthly basis in 1948, with the result that by reason of her poor
health she was not occupying it on January 1, 1949. She always
claimed it as her home, and made costly repairs to the property.
To assume that the Supreme Court of Florida, in affirming denial
of exemption, intended to abolish the basic concept of domicil in
Florida law is unthinkable. The only other explanation possible is
that plaintiff abandoned her admittedly established home; and this
in turn necessarily means that she acquired another domicil elsewhere. Yet the only other places she occupied were the hotel room,' 8
the hospital, the convalescent home, and the private home where she
was receiving the required dietary and nursing care in 1949. There
being no dispute as to the relevant evidentiary facts, the issue presented is the legal question of whether such facts establish abandonment of the homestead, in the tax sense of domicil, under Article
X of the Florida Constitution. Assuming careful study of the record
by the seven justices, the conclusion is inescapable either that the
decision is erroneous or that the Supreme Court in the instant case has
overruled all its prior decisions on physical abandonment- including
the factually similar Nelson v. Hainlin,19 and has now established the
rule that the domicil of an injured person is transferred with him to
the hospital.
18

For the period during which she occupied the hotel room part-time she was

granted the exemption; it was not denied until her serious accident necessitated
hospitalization and nursing care and she rented her home from month to month.

1989 Fla. 356, 104 So. 589 (1925).
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